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There's a new player in Yandle's classic dynamic.
Bootleggers, Baptists,
and Televangeli sts
BY ANDREW P. MORRISS
University of Illinois
n 1998, 46 state attorneys general, together with a
group of private attorneys, reached a Master Set-
tlement Agreement with Philip Morris, R.J.
Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, and Lorillard, the
nation's four largest cigarette manufacturers. The
agreement effectively imposed a hefty tax on smok-
ers nationwide to fund billions of dollars in payouts
to the states (and the participating private attorneys) and cre-
ated barriers to entry into the cigarette business to protect the
signatories from price competition. The agreement included
a model statute that states had to adopt in order to receive the
cash, foreclosing the opportunity for state legislatures to exer-
cise independent review of the settlement. One observer of the
agreement described it as "the largest privately negotiated
transfer of wealth arising out of litigation in world history."
The settlement and proposed statute substituted a private
agreement for the normal processes of regulation and taxa-
tion. They dramatically reduced the public's opportunity to
participate in both and to hold accountable those responsi-
ble for regulatory burdens and tax increases. How Americans
ended up with regulation and taxation without representation
is a story of "bootleggers, Baptists, and televangelists."
BOOTLEGGERS AND BAPTISTS
In 1983, economist Bruce Yandle published an article in Reg-
ulation entitled "Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of
a Regulatory Economist." In the article, Yandle set out a cru-
cial insight of public choice theory using the metaphor of the
implicit coalition of bootleggers and Baptists behind laws
that forbade liquor sales on Sundays. He noted that despite
their quite different views on liquor generally, bootleggers
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and Baptists shared a common interest in restricting Sunday
sales. The Baptists, of course, opposed liquor sales generally
for moral reasons. The bootleggers wanted to restrict compe-
tition on Sundays from legal liquor sellers. While the boot-
leggers could hardly lobby explicitly for Sunday closing on the
grounds that it would allow them to charge more for their
product, they could use Baptist arguments to support politi-
cians who publicly supported Sunday closing laws. The implic-
it coalition of bootleggers and Baptists thus married the eco-
nomic muscle of the bootleggers to the publicly acceptable
policy arguments of the Baptists, allowing both groups to
achieve a policy objective neither was strong enough to obtain
on its own. Much regulation, Yandle surmised, is the product
of similar coalitions.
The history of tobacco regulation includes quite a few
episodes of bootleggers-and-Baptists coalitions in the 1960s
and 1970s. While there were sporadic efforts to suppress
tobacco use almost from the time it appeared in Europe -
James I of England published A Counter-Blaste to Tobacco in
1604, denouncing smoking as "a custom loathsome to the eye,
hateful to the nose, harmful to the brain, dangerous to the
lung, and the black stinking fume thereof, nearest resembling
the horribly Stygian smoke of the pit that is bottomless" -
serious regulatory efforts appeared in the United States only
in the 1960s. Prior to then, smoking was a widely accepted
practice that government at all levels mostly ignored. Indeed,
the federal Food and Drug Administration had been explic-
itly foreclosed from regulating tobacco when it was created by
the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act and the agency consis-
tently foreswore any jurisdiction over smoking even after the
1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act granted the agency pow-
ers over "articles (other than food) intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body," a definition that
arguably could have been read to include cigarettes as nicotine
delivery devices. When confronted with proposed amend-
ments to the food and drug laws to give the FDA jurisdiction,
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Congress repeatedly rejected such efforts.
A 1953 study of the impact of the tar from tobacco smoke
on mice prompted widespread discussion of health con-
cerns about smoking. Responding to the demand for safer
cigarettes, manufacturers introduced low-tar brands and
added filters to existing brands, resulting in what became
known as the "tar derby," an expensive competition to
improve safety. When anti-smoking groups demanded gov-
ernment action, however, the tobacco companies were able
tee in 1962 to review the scientific evidence on smoking's
health effects, health regulators spotted an opportunity to
expand their regulatory authority. Only a week after the com-
mittee issued its report, the FTC proposed sweeping regula-
trions requiring health warnings on cigarette packages and
advertisements, arguing that not telling consumers about
potential health effects was an unfair and deceptive trade
practice that it had authority to prohibit. Congress, where sen-




to negotiate a deal with the Federal Trade Commission to
ban all tar and nicotine claims from cigarette advertising,
short-circuiting market pressures for safer cigarettes by elim-
inating health effects as a margin for competition. Although
the FTC touted the ban as an example of "industry-govern-
ment cooperation in solving a pressing problem," the reali-
ty was that the "bootleggers" had just succeeded in using
"Baptist" rhetoric to reduce competition. As Lee Fritschler
concluded in his 1969 analysis of tobacco policy, the regu-
latory climate of the period was imbued with "a spirit of
friendly and quiet cooperation between Congress, the
bureaucracy, and the interest group community."
When Surgeon General Luther Terry convened a commit-
positions as a result of the seniority system for committee
assignments and the safe seats of many Southern members of
Congress, disagreed. After persuading the FTC to withdraw its
proposed regulations, the tobacco industry's lobbying team
put together a successful legislative package with weaker warn-
ing labels and preemption of state and local warning label
requirements, and succeeded in moving the debate to the
more sympathetic terrain of the halls of Congress. So favor-
able to tobacco interests was the resulting statute that anti-
smoking activists denounced it as "one of the dirtiest pieces
of legislation ever." The bootleggers had triumphed over the
Baptists again.
The bootleggers-and-Baptists pattern was repeated sever-
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al times during the 1960s. In 1967,John F. Banzhaf III, a New
York attorney in private practice, successfully persuaded the
Federal Communications Commission to apply the fairness
doctrine to tobacco advertising, requiring television stations
to provide organizations like the American Lung Association
with free anti-smoking ads when they aired tobacco ads.
Banzhaf's success persuaded him to leave practice and start
up Action on Smoking and Health, one of the first national
health interest groups focused on tobacco. (Banzhaf eventu-
ally became a law professor at George Washington University
and remains active on tobacco issues. His webpage notes
approvingly that he has been called "the Osama bin Laden of
Torts" and a "Legal Flamethrower.")
The anti-smoking campaign took its toll on sales. Per-capi-
ta cigarette consumption fell by 5.7 percent between 1967
and 1970. After the FCC's position was upheld by the courts
(in part because of clever lawyering by Banzhaf that maneu-
vered the appeal into the D.C. Circuit instead of the presum-
ably tobacco-friendly territory of Richmond, Va., and the
Fourth Circuit), the FCC prepared to launch additional anti-
tobacco regulations.
Again the industry turned to Congress for help and suc-
cessfully obtained a complete ban on advertising in electron-
ic media beginning in 1971 as a result of the Public Health Cig-
arette Smoking Act of 1969. The ban not only saved the
cigarette companies future ad bills (they spent $200 million
on electronic media ads in 1969) and got rid of the anti-smok-
ing public service announcements, but it created a substan-
tial barrier to entry for potential competitors. Since the estab-
lished brands already enjoyed widespread name recognition,
their television and radio advertising was largely aimed at
nibbling away at the other established brands' market share
and repelling competing brands' efforts to do the same. For
a new brand, however, television and radio offered virtually the
only way to create quickly an identity for a product. Without
access to electronic media, it would be much harder for a new
competitor to break into the cigarette market. And without the
anti-tobacco ads, per-capita tobacco consumption began to
rise again after 1970, returning to 1967 levels by 1973. (A new
decline set in then, but the drop was more gradual this time.)
Once again, the bootleggers came out of the deal with a good
deal more than the Baptists did.
Bootlegger strength on Capitol Hill and in presidential
politics protected tobacco into the 1980s. For example, when
Joseph Califano, Jimmy Carter's secretary of health, education
and welfare, launched an anti-tobacco initiative in 1978 by call-
ing cigarettes "Public Enemy No. 1," Carter quickly distanced
himself from Califano's comments, traveling to North Car-
olina to tell an audience of tobacco warehousemen that he
admired "the beautiful quality of your tobacco." Carter's top
White House health aide, Peter Bourne, told the American
Cancer Society that tobacco had "emotionally stabilizing
effects." Califano's friend, Sen. Edward Kennedy, eventually
told Califano to resign in April 1979 because his comments
jeopardized the Democratic ticket in the South.
Partly as a result of its success in the 1970s, tobacco large-
ly went undisturbed by federal regulators until Clinton admin-
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istration FDA commissioner David Kessler made an effort to
assert his agency's jurisdiction over tobacco. The bootleggers-
and-Baptists era of tobacco regulation thus has to be scored
as an overall win for the bootleggers.
LAWYERS AND LITIGATION
In addition to periodic assaults by regulators, tobacco com-
panies have experienced three waves of private litigation over
the health effects of smoking. The first wave began in 1954
when the first of more than 100 suits were brought on behalf
of smokers against tobacco companies under theories of neg-
ligence, breach of implied warranty, and breach of express
warranty. The tobacco companies successfully argued that
smokers knew that smoking was potentially hazardous, mak-
ing sure that their legal point got through by hiring many of
the best law firms in the country to defend the suits and over-
whelming the lawyers from small personal injury firms who
represented the plaintiffs. By the mid-1960s, this first wave was
over and the tobacco companies had not lost a single case.
In 1983, a second wave of tobacco suits began. Using new
data on health effects, a group of entrepreneurial plaintiffs'
lawyers began suing under theories of strict liability and fail-
ure to warn. This time the plaintiffs' bar coordinated their
actions to allow them to combine resources in an effort to
compete with tobacco's "wall of flesh" defense strategy. Unfor-
tunately for the plaintiffs, the federal warning labels under-
cut their cases by bolstering the tobacco companies' claim
that smokers had assumed the risk of smoking. And juries
rarely proved willing to entertain plaintiffs' claims, reasoning
that while the tobacco companies may not have been forth-
right about the exact nature of tobacco's dangers, smokers
had to have understood that there was serious risk involved
in smoking.
Once again the tobacco companies triumphed, although
their victory was tarnished by the public relations disaster of
disclosing numerous confidential documents that painted
them in an unflattering light. Not only had discovery
unearthed much that the tobacco companies wished to keep
hidden, but a series of high-profile internal whistleblowers
leaked additional documents. (Northeastern University law
professor Richard Daynard played a crucial role in ensuring
that the documents received widespread dissemination and in
coordinating the plaintiffs' suits.)
A new group of attorneys began a third wave of suits in
1992. This time the tobacco powerhouse had an adversary with
significant resources: lawyers who had made fortunes in
asbestos litigation. Their experience had taught them tactics
like "massing up" claims to make the risk of loss unacceptable
to defendants. At the top of the plaintiffs' bar, the lawyers had
both the resources to pursue a long-term litigation strategy
and the professional desire to attain what Dan Zegart's gen-
erally flattering account of the tobacco litigation termed
"Mount Everest, or maybe Fort Knox." To overcome the
assumption-of-risk defense, some of the third-wave cases were
built around clients who could claim damages from smoking
by others. For example, a class action was filed on behalf of air-
line stewards affected by secondhand smoke on planes. But
avoiding smokers as plaintiffs also kept potential damage
awards low, making the suits less economically rewarding for
the lawyers. One group of 60 firms pooled contributions (at
$100,000 per year per firm) to fund a national class action for
$100 billion on behalf of smokers for the costs of the smok-
ers' addiction to nicotine, but this failed when the relatively
conservative federal Fifth Circuit Court ofAppeals refused to
approve the certification of the class. Despite the better fund-
ing and the documents from the whistleblowers and the sec-
ond-wave suits, the third-wave suits were not succeeding.
However, the suits were costing the tobacco companies
money. By 1997, the six largest companies were spending $600
million per year on legal bills. And the companies had a legit-
imate worry that eventually this group of plaintiffs' lawyers
Moore in an attempt to withdraw the state from the case. The
Mississippi Supreme Court ruled in Moore's favor.) The two
soon planned a campaign against the cigarette companies
that would combine a public interest rationale with the finan-
cial and tactical power of the top plaintiffs' firms in the coun-
try and Mississippi filed the first suit in May 1994. Using
Scruggs' jet, Moore toured the country, persuading other
attorneys general to file their own suits. Minnesota and West
Virginia filed suits later that year and Florida and Massachu-
setts brought suits in 1995. More soon followed and ulti-
mately every state participated.
The attorneys general had several motives for participating.
First, bashing tobacco had become good politics as the indus-
try's public image sank as the revelations from the internal
The bootleggers were in need of new allies
because the risk of seemingly endless litigation
was taking its toll on their stock prices.
might succeed in cracking open "Fort Knox" by winning a case.
Despite their success, by the mid-1990s the tobacco compa-
nies were in a difficult position.
RISE OF THE TELEVANGELISTS
By the 1990s, the regulatory Baptists were tired of their role
in the tobacco wars. Each of their victories - banning TV ads,
restrictions on tar and nicotine advertising, warning labels -
had proven to be helpful for the regulatory bootleggers. But
the bootleggers were in need of new allies because the risk of
the seemingly endless litigation from the third-wave lawsuits
was taking its toll on their stock prices. This led to the rise of
the regulatory "televangelists."
As part of the effort to overcome the assumption-of-risk
defense, a small group of plaintiffs' lawyers had come up with
the idea of suing on behalf of a plaintiff who had never smoked
yet had suffered extremely large damages: state governments.
State Medicaid programs had paid out considerable sums for
smokers' illnesses. If the states could be persuaded to sign on
as plaintiffs, the damages could be considerable.
Although the various accounts of the origins of the Med-
icaid reimbursement theory differ on how much credit is due
to which participant, it is generally accepted that Mississippi
plaintiffs' counsel Richard "Dickie" Scruggs played a crucial
role. (Scruggs was recently in the news when he pleaded guilty
in March 2008 to attempting to bribe a judge in an unrelat-
ed case.) Not only was Scruggs wealthy enough from his suc-
cessful asbestos and tort practice, but his law school classmate
Michael Moore (no relation to the filmmaker) had become
Mississippi's attorney general. Moore brought to the table his
ability to commit Mississippi to the lawsuits. (This was not a
foregone conclusion; Mississippi governor Kirk Fordice sued
documents continued to leak out. Second, there was poten-
tially a great deal of money on the table in any favorable res-
olution of the claims, both for the lawyers involved (who
might then make generous campaign donations to the attor-
neys general) and for the states (whose grateful legislators
might then support the attorneys general in future endeavors).
Third, all but seven states choose their attorneys general by
election, and the position has traditionally been a stepping
stone to higher office. The publicity surrounding the suits was
itself valuable for the state attorneys general.
To enhance their suits, some states followed Florida's lead
and changed state laws retroactively to make the suits easier
to prove. And, although a small number of elite plaintiffs'
lawyers provided the legal muscle and financial resources for
most states' suits, the states began adding local firms as co-
counsel. The local firms typically brought little to the table
besides connections to state attorneys general and other offi-
cials - and a healthy appetite for fees. (Texas attorney gener-
al Dan Morales and a lawyer friend were ultimately convicted
of federal charges in connection with Morales' efforts to award
the friend 3 percent of Texas' $17.5 billion settlement.)
An important feature of the states' suits was that they were
predicated upon forcing a settlement. The claims in the law-
suits were sufficient to get past motions to dismiss - if only
because a state judge was unlikely to reject out-of-hand a
claim brought by his state's attorney general that held out the
promise of billions of revenue for the state treasury. But the
lawsuits would have been extraordinarily risky for the public
and private lawyers to take to trial. Not only had the private
attorneys invested millions in the cases, but trying the cases
would expose the weaknesses in the legal theories to more
scrutiny than they might be able to stand. Mimicking the
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asbestos tactic of "massing up" claims, Moore and Scruggs and
the other early participants pushed hard to build a broad
coalition of states to ensure that the tobacco companies would
have no choice but to settle. The tactic worked (with a little
help from the FDA's Kessler), as the tobacco companies sought
a settlement that would give them "peace, forever."
Kessler played the role of a particularly zealous Baptist,
whose zeal was a barrier to a traditional bootleggers-and-Bap-
tist coalition. Having learned from the prior losses to tobac-
co, Kessler wanted a wholesale restructuring of the tobacco
industry. Once Republican control of Congress in 1994 stalled
the Clinton administration's legislative agenda, Kessler per-
suaded the White House to allow him simply to assert that the
FDA had jurisdiction over cigarettes as part of a campaign
Two provisions were crucial to obtaining the tobacco com-
panies' agreement. First, the structure of the settlement meant
that the payments were to come from future revenues, not the
companies' bank accounts. Because cigarettes are generally
price-inelastic (at least in the short run), the number sold
would not fall much if the price goes up. In essence, the tobac-
co companies were promising to tax their customers for the
benefit of the states. Since they were giving away someone
else's money, the financial provisions were less painful to the
industry than they initially appreciated.
Second, the agreement included provisions that would
attempt to protect the settling firms from price competition
by newer firms. The problem with the "future price increases
as implicit tax" approach to the payment of the damages was
The willingness to sacrifice substantive change
enabled the televangelists to use the Baptists' cover
without having to accomplish the Baptists' goals.
against children smoking. Although the tobacco companies
defeated the FDA's effort - largely because it so blatantly con-
tradicted decades of consistent statements by the agency that
it lacked such jurisdiction - the FDA's effort made it clear that
the industry needed protection.
The attorneys general and plaintiffs' lawyers represented a
new type of player that could be dubbed "the televangelist."
The regulatory televangelists mouthed the pieties of the Bap-
tists, but the televangelists' focus was on temporal rewards.
Even Zegart's pro-plaintiff account of the litigation includes
a quote from one lawyer who conceded that though the plain-
tiffs' lawyers claimed they were engaged in an idealistic cru-
sade, "It's all about the money. Never forget that." The will-
ingness to sacrifice substantive accomplishments enabled the
televangelists to utilize the ideological cover that the Baptists
provided while freeing the parties from actually worrying
about accomplishing the Baptists' policy goals. As the tobac-
co companies began looking for a solution to their litigation
problem, this substantive flexibility would make a settlement
possible.
THE RESOLUTION
In early 1997, the four largest tobacco companies began nego-
tiations with the states and their assorted lawyers. The deal
that emerged essentially traded the companies' recognition of
limited FDA authority over tobacco, $10 billion in initial pay-
ments, and annual payments of $15 billion thereafter for
immunity from future private lawsuits. The agreement was
embodied in a document that became known simply as "the
Resolution." (During the negotiations, the four states with
fast-approaching trial dates worked out individual resolu-
tions.)
that new entrants might undercut the existing firms' sales.
Since the suits were predicated on past behavior by the incum-
bents, there was no basis to bring a new suit against a new
entrant. And since the provisions were in a settlement, they
bound only the parties to the lawsuits. The solution was to
require states to pass statutes that created an alternative pay-
ment requirement for non-signatories as part of the package,
as well as relieving the defendants of some of their financial
obligations if their market share dropped significantly after
the settlement.
The deal soon ran aground on Washington politics. The
attorneys general had not reckoned on the fury of the spurned
regulatory Baptists, who launched an all-out effort to tough-
en the settlement's terms. More importantly, the parties had
neglected to provide enough revenue and glory for federal
politicians. To demonstrate their toughness on public health
issues, congressmen and senators piled additional penalties
and provisions onto the bill approving the agreement. The
Clinton White House withheld its endorsement, despite the
hiring of Hillary Clinton's brother, Hugh Rodham, as part of
the states' legal team. (Rodham's undistinguished legal career
did not involve any major trials, which suggests that his role
was to provide "access" in hopes of obtaining presidential
backing.) When the bill implementing the agreement took on
the appearance of a Christmas tree, the tobacco companies
withdrew their support and the federal settlement died in
June 1998.
MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
None of the parties or lawyers could simply walk away when
the federal deal collapsed. The private lawyers had too much
money tied up in the cases to write them off as a bad invest-
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ment, the attorneys general had staked their careers on suc-
cess, and the tobacco companies still needed protection from
the third wave and future suits. In February 1998, the 46
states remaining and the four largest tobacco companies pro-
duced a scaled-down version of the Resolution dubbed "the
Master Settlement Agreement" (MSA). By eliminating the FDA
and immunity provisions, the MSA solved the Resolution's
problems with Congress. Reflecting the lower value of a deal
without immunity, the MSA lowered the companies' payments
to $206 billion from $365 billion. It retained, however, the
approach of protecting the incumbents' market share from
price competition by new firms and the implicit tax on smok-
ers to fund the deal.
The MSA included a model statute that a state agreeing to
the deal would have to adopt. The statute presented state leg-
islatures with a difficult choice: either they accept the MSA in
whole, in which case they would be able to spend their state's
share of the billions of dollars raised from smokers, or they
could reject the proposed statute and their states' smokers
would still pay the higher prices necessary to fund the deal but
they Would lose their claim on the money. Not surprisingly,
every state legislature took the money.
Unlike the regulatory Baptists, the televangelists had little
interest in continuing once their fees were secure. All the
firms that actually did the work on the state suits have since
moved on to other areas and no longer do tobacco work.
State legislators proved no more principled. For example,
Florida (where the legislature had previously amended the law
to make winning the suit easier) found itself with a problem
when a private plaintiff won a $145 billion punitive damage
award in a tobacco case in 2000. The state quickly amended
its appeal bond statute to eliminate the requirement that a
supersedeas bond for the full amount be posted to prevent exe-
cution on the judgment pending appeal. Nor did states live up
to their pious rhetoric when it came time to use the money to
finance anti-smoking campaigns and other health programs.
Less than a third of the revenue received has actually been
spent on health-related items and almost none has gone to
teen anti-smoking measures, a key rationale for the suits.
FUTURE TELEVANGELISTS
Unfortunately the future is bright for other regulatory tele-
vangelists to play a role in regulation. Televangelists are bet-
ter partners for bootleggers than Baptists because the tele-
vangelists care less about the substance and focus on their own
rewards. While that is good news for the bootleggers, it is bad
news for the groups - like the smokers in the tobacco exam-
ple - who the bootleggers and televangelists combine against.
Moreover, as the history of tobacco regulation reveals,
bootlegger-Baptist coalitions are limited by the inherent con-
flicts between bootleggers and Baptists. By the 1990s, the
health interest groups and public health regulators were no
longer willing to participate in such coalitions about tobac-
co because they had learned from their past failures. The tel-
evangelists, on the other hand, were happy to strike a deal with
the bootleggers.
Our future likely holds more such arrangements, in part
because the combination of asbestos and tobacco money has
created a class of entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyers who have
the resources to attack other businesses in search of the next
"Fort Knox." The tobacco lawyers have already begun to sue
insurance companies, fast food chains, gun manufacturers,
and silica product producers.
Making such alliances more difficult will not be easy. Set-
tlements offer regulators of all types opportunities to make
policy outside the public eye. For example, the lengthy MSA
documents included no index, and there was no provision for
public participation in the settlement hearings as there is
with respect to rulemaking. One means of making such coali-
tions more difficult to form and maintain would be for courts
to expand public participation in settlement hearings when
the settlement itself proposes regulatory action (such as the
implicit tax increase included in the MSA).
A second means of disrupting televangelist-bootlegger
alliances is to restrict access to the money that drives the deal
forward. A crucial part of the tobacco alliance was the shar-
ing of the spoils between the entrepreneurial lawyers like
Scruggs and the politically connected local firms. Requiring
all contracts for outside attorneys to be awarded through
competitive bidding, with the terms made public, would make
it more difficult for state attorneys general to strike deals
(implicit or explicit) for contributions from the firms award-
ed such contracts. Exposing such contracts to sunlight would
also allow outside organizations to follow the money trail,
making it harder to conceal corrupt bargains like the one
struck by Texas' Dan Morales. The potential gains to both
bootleggers and televangelists are so large that only constant
scrutiny can provide a real check on such alliances. l
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